Meyers v. Meyers

Now that I have had time to read the Meyers v. Meyers case, upon which the court in the Ryan matter sought supplemental briefs from the parties on UL’s Motion to Dismiss, I can certainly see why UL is pleased to have the Meyers decision to rely upon in its pending Motion to Dismiss.

Following is my short synopsis and analysis of the case in order to illustrate its relevance to the Ryan matter.

In Meyers, the plaintiff sought damages for failure to pay overtime under the Indiana Code, recovery of money for taxes withheld from the plaintiff's payroll checks but not deposited with the IRS, and damages for his wrongful dismissal in retaliation for his complaint about the employer’s failure to pay overtime and deposit withheld taxes.

The defendants successfully moved to dismiss the retaliatory discharge count for failure to state a claim.

The plaintiff tried to argue – as Ryan is trying to argue – that an at will employee may maintain a cause of action for a retaliatory discharge if the employee had been terminated from his employment for exercising a statutory right or refusing to violate a statutory duty.

However, Indiana generally follows the employment at will doctrine, which permits both the employer and the employee to terminate the employment at any time for a “good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.”  According to the decision in Meyers, only on rare occasions have Indiana courts recognized narrow exceptions to this doctrine.

The Meyers court reiterated that which had been stated in Indiana courts many times in the past: that the "employment at will doctrine has steadfastly been recognized and enforced as the public policy of this state" and that "[r]evision or rejection of the doctrine is better left to the legislature."

The plaintiff in Meyers sought to rely upon the 1973 decision in Frampton v. Cent. Indiana Gas Co. because at one point, the Frampton opinion commented that "when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right, an exception to the general rule must be recognized."

However, the Meyers court said that the decisions during the intervening thirty years have made it plain that this language is intended to recognize quite a limited exception, and most courts have refused to extend Frampton.  Other than the Frampton exception, which is grounded on express statutory language, the Indiana appellate cases permitting retaliatory discharge actions have generally involved plaintiffs allegedly terminated in retaliation for refusing to commit an illegal act, or for fulfilling a statutory duty.

(For example, a truck driver was permitted to pursue a retaliatory discharge claim against his employer who fired him when he refused to haul a load that exceeded the amount allowed on Illinois roads, an illegal act for which the employee could have been held personally liable; an employee was permitted to pursue a retaliatory discharge claim where he alleged he was fired for refusing to file fraudulent tax return; and an employee was permitted to pursue a retaliatory discharge claim where she alleged she was fired for complying with a summons for jury duty.) None of these situations are analogous to Ryan’s situation.)

It looks as though Indiana is not keen on watering down its employment at will doctrine.  The Meyers decision mentions some additional cases of relevance the Ryan case, including one in which employment was terminated because the employee complained about the employer's products and alleged improper activities by supervisors, and one in which employment was terminated for truthful reporting of a supervisor's improper activities. Given the at will employment doctrine in Indiana, the courts in those cases found that the plaintiffs could not succeed.

It appears to me that Ryan’s case is not even as strong as the latter two above, which failed.